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Map of the World with the Participants in World War I. The Allies are depicted in green, the Central Powers in orange, and neutral countries in grey.
Paris Peace Conference, Greek and French proposals
Paris Peace Conference, Armenian proposal

The Paris Peace Conference took place in 1919 and involved diplomats from more than 30 countries. They met in an attempt to form a lasting peace throughout the world. The conference took place in Paris and Versailles, soon after the end of World War I.

Contents

Overview

The conference opened on January 18, 1919.[1] It came to a close on January 21, 1920 with the inaugural General Assembly of the League of Nations.

The following treaties were prepared at the Paris Peace Conference (in absence of the affected countries):

The disposition of the lands of the former Ottoman Empire were also considered. These discussions included competing European and American aims generally, and competing nationalist Zionist and Arab claims in Palestine. The latter were conditionally agreed to previously by the Faisal-Weizmann Agreement on 3 January 1919. On January 30, the Conference decided that the Arab provinces should be wholly separated from the Ottoman Empire and the newly conceived mandate-system applied to them. This decision clashed with the expectation of Faisal's Arab delegation that his state would include Palestine, and the conditional understandings reached in the Faisal-Weizmann Agreement.

On February 3, Chaim Weizmann, the leader of the Zionist delegation, presented its case in a Statement, together with a map of the proposed country. The statement supported the creation of a mandate entrusted to Britain, it detailed this affinity and stated the Jewish historical connection with the area. It also declared the Zionist’s proposed borders and resources “essential for the necessary economic foundation of the country” including “the control of its rivers and their headwaters”. It included statements by others.[2] On 6 February, Faysal addressing the Conference noted previous Allied promises, demanded independence of the whole of Arab Asia, and suggested the establishment of a confederation. He stated that the Arabs needed help but not at the price of their independence. Subsequently a dispute between Great Britain and France concerning the geographical area of Syria and the previously secret Sykes-Picot Agreement delayed decision on various claims.[3]

The Paris peace treaties, together with the accords of the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-1922, laid the foundations for the so-called Versailles-Washington system of international relations. The remaking of the world map at these conferences gave birth to a number of critical conflict-prone international contradictions, which would become one of the causes of World War II.[4]

The decision to create the League of Nations and the approval of its Charter both took place during the conference.

The 'Big Four' — Georges Clemenceau, Prime Minister of France; David Lloyd George, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom; Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States; and Vittorio Orlando, Prime Minister of Italy — were the dominant diplomatic figures at the conference. The conclusions of their talks were imposed on the defeated countries.

Australian approach

The Australian delegates were Billy Hughes (Prime Minister), and Joseph Cook (Minister of the Navy), accompanied by Robert Garran (Solicitor-General). John Greig Latham later Sir, was also part of the delegation. Frederic Eggleston had been invited, but left in disgust at Hughes' behaviour. Indeed, Latham was to run successfully for the Federal seat of Kooyong on a policy of 'Get Rid of Hughes', so appalled was he at Hughes' behaviour. Their principal aims were war reparations, annexation of German New Guinea and rejection of the Japanese racial equality proposal (see below). Hughes had a profound interest in what he saw as an extension of the White Australia Policy. Despite causing a big scene, Hughes had to acquiesce to a class C mandate for New Guinea.

President Wilson asked Hughes if Australia really wanted to flout world opinion by profiting from Germany's defeat and extending its sovereignty as far north as the equator; Hughes famously replied: "That's about the size of it, Mr. President".[5]

French approach

The chief goal of the French leader, Georges Clemenceau, was to weaken Germany militarily, strategically, and economically. Having personally witnessed two German attacks on French soil in the last forty years, the French Premier was adamant that Germany should not be permitted to attack France again. In particular, Clemenceau sought an American and British guarantee of French security in the event of another German attack. Clemenceau also expressed skepticism and frustration with Wilson's Fourteen Points: "Mr. Wilson bores me with his fourteen points," complained Clemenceau. "Why, God Almighty has only ten!" (referring to the Ten Commandments)

Another alternative French policy was to seek a rapprochement with Germany. In May 1919, the diplomat René Massigli was sent on several secret missions to Berlin. During his visits, Massigli offered his behalf of his government to revise the territorial and economic clauses of the upcoming peace treaty.[6] Massigli of the desirability of “practical, verbal discussions” between French and German officials that would lead to a “collaboration franco-allemand”.[7] Furthermore, Massagli told the Germans that the French thought of the “Anglo-Saxon powers”, namely the United States and British Empire to be the major threat to France in the post-war world, argued that both France and Germany had a joint interest in opposing “Anglo-Saxon domination” of the world and warned that the “deepening of opposition” between the French and the Germans “would lead to the ruin of both countries, to the advantage of the Anglo-Saxon powers”.[8] The French offers to the Germans was rejected by the latter because the Germans considered the French overtures to be a trap to trick them into accepting the Versailles treaty “as is” and because the German foreign minister, Count Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau thought that the United States was more likely to soften the peace terms than France.[9]

There was also some strange affairs with president Wilson playing with all of the delegates so they can gain trust with him.[citation needed]

Italy's approach

Italy had been persuaded first to join the Triple Alliance and then to join the Allies in order to gain land. In the Treaty of London, 1915, they had been offered the Trentino and the Tyrol as far as Brenner, Trieste and Istria, all the Dalmatian coast except Fiume, full ownership of Albanian Valona and a protectorate over Albania, Antalya in Turkey and a share of Turkish and German Empires in Africa.

Vittorio Orlando was sent as the Italian representative with the aim of gaining these and as much other territory as possible. The loss of 700,000 Italians and a budget deficit of 12,000,000,000 Lire during the war made the Italian government and people feel entitled to these territories. There was an especially strong opinion for control of Fiume, which they believed was rightly Italian due to the Italian population.

Nevertheless, by the end of the war the allies had made contradictory agreements with other nations, especially in Central Europe and the Middle-East. In the meetings of the "Big Four," in which Orlando's powers of diplomacy were inhibited by his lack of English, the Great powers were only willing to offer Trentino to the Brenner, the Dalmatian port of Zara, the Island of Lagosta and a couple of small German colonies. All other territories were promised to other nations and the great powers were worried about Italy's imperial ambitions. As a result of this, Orlando left the conference in a rage (Jackson, 1938).

Japan's approach

The Japanese delegation was headed by Saionji Kimmochi, with Baron Makino Nobuaki, Viscount Chinda Sutemi (ambassador in London), Matsui Keishiro (ambassador in Paris) and Ijuin Hikokichi (ambassador in Rome) and others making a total of 64. Neither Hara Takashi (Prime Minister) nor Yasuya Uchida (Foreign Minister) felt able to leave Japan so shortly after their election. The delegation focused on two demands: (a) the inclusion of their racial equality proposal and (b) territorial claims for the former German colonies; Shandong (including Jiaozhou Bay)and the Pacific islands north of the Equator i.e., the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, the Mariana Islands, and the Carolines. Makino was de facto chief as Saionji's role was symbolic, limited by ill-health. The Japanese were unhappy with the conference because they got only one half of the rights of Germany, and walked out of the conference.

The racial equality proposal

After the end of seclusion, Japan suffered unequal treaties and dreamed of obtaining equal status with the Powers. In this context, the Japanese delegation to the Paris peace conference proposed the racial equality proposal. The first draft was presented to the League of Nations Commission on 13 February as an amendment to Article 21:

The equality of nations being a basic principle of the League of Nations, the High Contracting Parties agree to accord as soon as possible to all alien nationals of states, members of the League, equal and just treatment in every respect making no distinction, either in law or in fact, on account of their race or nationality.

It should be noted that the Japanese delegation did not realize the full ramifications of their proposal, and the challenge its adoption would have put to the established norms of the (Western dominated) international system of the day, involving as it did the colonial subjugation of non-white peoples. In the impression of the Japanese delegation, they were only asking for League of Nations to accept the equality of Japanese nationals; however, a universalist meaning and implication of the proposal became attached to it within the delegation, which drove its contentiousness at the conference.[10]

The proposal received a majority vote on 28 April 1919. 11 out of the 17 delegates present voted in favor to its amendment to the charter, and no negative vote was taken. The votes for the amendment tallied thus:

  • Japan (2) Yes
  • France (2) Yes
  • Italy (2) Yes
  • Brazil (1) Yes
  • China (1) Yes
  • Greece (1) Yes
  • Serbia (1) Yes
  • Czechoslovakia (1) Yes

Total: 11 Yes

  • British Empire (2) - Not Registered
  • United States (2) - Not Registered
  • Portugal (1) - Not Registered
  • Romania (1) - Not Registered
  • Belgium (2) - absent[11]

The chairman, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, overturned it saying that although the proposal had been approved by a clear majority, that in this particular matter, strong opposition had manifested itself, and that on this issue a unanimous vote would be required. This strong opposition came from the British delegation[citation needed]. Though in a diary entry by House it says that President Wilson was at least tacitly in favor of accepting the proposal[citation needed], but in the end he felt that British support for the League of Nations was a more crucial goal. There is not much evidence to show that Wilson agreed strongly enough with the proposal to risk alienating the British delegation over it[citation needed]. It is said that behind the scenes Billy Hughes and Joseph Cook vigorously opposed it as it undermined the White Australia Policy. Later, as conflicts between Japan and the U.S. widened, the Japanese media reported the case widely — leading to a grudge toward the U.S. in Japanese public opinion and becoming one of the main pretexts of Pearl Harbor and World War II.[citation needed]

As such, this point could be listed among the many causes of conflict which lead to World War II, which were left unaddressed at the close of World War I. It is both ironic and indicative, of the scale of the changes in the mood of the international system, that this contentious point of racial equality would later be incorporated into the United Nations Charter in 1945 as the fundamental principle of international justice.

Territorial claims

The Japanese claim to Shandong was disputed by the Chinese. In 1914 at the outset of First World War Japan had seized the territory granted to Germany in 1897. They also seized the German islands in the Pacific north of the equator. In 1917, Japan had made secret agreements with Britain, France and Italy as regards their annexation of these territories. With Britain, there was a mutual agreement, Japan also agreeing to support British annexation of the Pacific islands south of the equator. Despite a generally pro-Chinese view on behalf of the American delegation, Article 156 of the Treaty of Versailles transferred German concessions in Shandong, China to Japan rather than returning sovereign authority to China. The leader of the Chinese delegation, Lu Zhengxiang, demanded that a reservation be inserted before he would sign the treaty. The reservation was denied, and the treaty was signed by all the delegations except that of China. Chinese outrage over this provision led to demonstrations known as the May Fourth Movement. The Pacific islands north of the equator became a class C mandate administered by Japan.

United Kingdom's approach

The British Air Section at the Conference

Maintenance of the British Empire's unity, holdings and interests were an overarching concern for the United Kingdom's delegates to the conference, but it entered the conference with the more specific goals of:

  • Ensuring the security of France
  • Removing the threat of the German High Seas Fleet
  • Settling territorial contentions
  • Supporting the Wilsonian League of Nations

with that order of priority.

The Racial Equality Proposal put forth by the Japanese did not directly conflict with any of these core British interests. However, as the conference progressed the full implications of the Racial Equality Proposal, regarding immigration to the British Dominions (specifically Australia), would become a major point of contention within the delegation.

Ultimately, Britain did not see the Racial Equality proposal as being one of the fundamental aims of the conference. The delegation was therefore willing to sacrifice this proposal in order to placate the Australian delegation and thus help satisfy its overarching aim of preserving the unity of the British Empire.[12]

Britain also managed to rebuff attempts by the envoys of the Irish nationalist movement to put its case to the Conference for self-determination, diplomatic recognition and membership of the proposed League of Nations[citation needed].

United States' approach

Prior to Wilson's arrival in Europe, no American President had ever visited Europe while in office.[13] Wilson's Fourteen Points, of a year earlier, had helped win the hearts and minds of many as the war ended; these included Americans and Europeans generally, as well as Germany, its allies and the former subjects of the Ottoman Empire specifically. Wilson's diplomacy and his Fourteen Points had essentially established the conditions for the armistices that had brought an end to World War I. Wilson felt it was his duty and obligation to the people of the world to be a prominent figure at the peace negotiations. High hopes and expectations were placed on him to deliver what he had promised for the post-war era. In doing so, Wilson ultimately began to lead the foreign policy of the United States toward interventionism, a move strongly resisted in some domestic circles.

Once Wilson arrived, however, he found “rivalries, and conflicting claims previously submerged.”[3] He worked mostly trying to sway the direction that the French (Georges Clemenceau) and British (Lloyd George) delegations were taking towards Germany and its allies in Europe, as well as the former Ottoman lands in the Middle East. Wilson's attempts to gain acceptance of his Fourteen Points ultimately failed, after France and Britain refused to adopt some specific points and its core principles.

In Europe, several of his Fourteen Points conflicted with the other powers. The United States did not encourage nor believe that the Article 231 placed on Germany was fair or warranted.[14] It would not be until 1921, when the United States finally signed separate peace treaties with Germany, Austria and Hungary.

In the Middle East, negotiations were complicated by competing aims, claims, and the new mandate system. The United States hoped to establish a more liberal and diplomatic world, as stated in the Fourteen Points, where democracy, sovereignty, liberty and self-determination would be respected. France and Britain, on the other hand, already controlled empires, wielded power over their subjects around the world, and still aspired to be dominant colonial powers.

In light of the previously secret Sykes-Picot Agreement, and following the adoption of the mandate system on the Arab province of the former Ottoman lands, the conference heard statements from competing Zionist and Arab claimants. President Woodrow Wilson then recommended an international commission of inquiry to ascertain the wishes of the local inhabitants. The Commission idea, first accepted by Great Britain and France, was later rejected. Eventually it became the purely American King-Crane Commission, which toured all Syria and Palestine during the summer of 1919, taking statements and sampling opinion.[3] Its report, presented to President Wilson, was kept secret from the public until the New York Times broke the story in December 1922.[15] A pro-Zionist joint resolution on Palestine was passed by Congress in September 1922.[16]

France and Britain tried to appease the American President by consenting to the establishment of his League of Nations. However, because isolationist sentiment was strong and some of the articles in the League's charter conflicted with the United States Constitution, the United States never did ratify the Treaty of Versailles nor join the League of Nations,[17] which President Wilson had helped create, to further peace through diplomacy rather than war and conditions which can breed it.

The United States had proved itself to be a major world player and a dominant military and economic power, but it had still failed to win the peace at Paris. The separate treaties with Germany,[18] Austria,[19] and Hungary[20] in 1921 reserved for the United States all reservations it might have had if it had joined the League of Nations, but accepted none of the obligations, because of the constitution. By this time, Warren G, Harding was President of the United States, and these separate treaties broke the deadlock on the League of Nations. These separate treaties kept the United States out of the League.

Statement of the Zionist Organization regarding Palestine

The Zionist Organization submitted their draft resolutions for consideration by the Peace Conference on February 3, 1919. This shortly followed the Conference's decision that the former Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire should be separated from it and the newly conceived mandate-system applied to them.

The statement included five main points:[21]

  • That the High Contracting Parties recognize the historic title of the Jewish people to Palestine as well as the right of the Jews to reconstitute their National Home in Palestine.
  • The boundaries of Palestine be declared as described in the attached Schedule.
  • The sovereign possession of Palestine be vested in the League of Nations and the Government entrusted to Great Britain as Mandatory of the League.
  • Other provisions to be inserted by the High Contracting Parties relating to the application of any general conditions attached to mandates, which are suitable to the case in Palestine.
  • The mandate shall be subject also to several noted special conditions.

Statement

The statement reiterates the historic title Zionist Jews claim regarding Palestine. They note five main considerations.

  • The land is the historic home of the Jews and they achieved their greatest development there; from there “emanated spiritual and moral influences of supreme value to mankind.” They were driven from Palestine by violence, “and through the ages they have never ceased to cherish the longing and the hope of a return.”
  • They note deplorable conditions for millions of Jews in some parts of the world, particularly Eastern Europe, because of congestion and denial of opportunities, which would make more healthy modern development possible. They note the need for new opportunities is urgent, both for the Jew’s own sake and in the interest of the population of other peoples living in Palestine. They claim Jewry chooses Palestine “above all others in which they would most wish to cast their lot.” With economic development, “Palestine can be made now as it was in ancient times, the home of a prosperous population many times as numerous as that which now inhabits it.”
  • Palestine is not large enough to contain more than a portion of the Jews of the world. The majority of the approximately fourteen million Jews scattered throughout the world must remain in their present locations, and it will be one of the concerns of the Peace Conference to ensure for them equal rights and humane conditions. A Jewish National Home in Palestine will be of high value to the Jews; its influence will permeate the Jews of the world, it will inspire millions, often despairing, with a new hope and a higher standard; it will help to make them even more useful citizens in the lands in which they currently reside.
  • Such a Palestine would be of value also to the world at large, whose real wealth consists in the healthy diversities of its peoples
  • The land of Palestine needs redemption and development; much of it is desolate and its present condition is poor. Two things are necessary for that redemption - a stable and enlightened government, and additional people to the present population, which shall be energetic, intelligent, devoted to the country, and backed by the large financial resources that are indispensable for development. The Jews alone can supply such a population.

The Statement notes Jewish activities and costs, inspired by Zionist ideas over the previous thirty years, that have been directed to Palestine under the Turkish administrative system and their relative success. It notes that Jews have adopted modern scientific methods and have shown themselves to be capable. The Hebrew language has been revived and is used in schools and is the language in daily usage among the Yishuv. It notes that the foundations of a Jewish University have been started in Jerusalem and funds have been contributed for its building and for its endowment. They note the amount of money spent since British occupation for relief, education and sanitation, and the great amounts needed to promote future development, including drainage and irrigation, transportation and all kinds of public works, as well as land settlement and house building. “Assuming a political settlement under which the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine is assured, the Jews of the world will make every effort to provide the vast sums of money that will be needed.”

The statement ends noting that the historic title of the Jews to Palestine was recognized by the British Balfour Declaration, 1917 and quotes it in full.

The Boundaries of Palestine

Boundary Schedule[21]

The boundaries of Palestine shall follow the general lines set out below: Starting on the North al a point on the Mediterranean Sea in the vicinity South of Sidon and following the watersheds of the foothills of the Lebanon as far as Jisr El Karaon, thence to El Bire following the dividing line between the two basins of tile Wad: El Kook and the Wadi Et Teim thence in a southerly direction following the dividing line between the Eastern and Western slopes of the Hermon, to the vicinity West of Beit Jenn, thence Eastward following the northern watersheds of the Nahr Mughaniye close to and west of the Hedjaz Railway In the East a line close to and West of the Hedjaz Railway terminating in the Gulf of Akaba. In the South a frontier to be agreed upon with the Egyptian Government. In the West the Mediterranean Sea. The details of the delimitations, or any necessary adjustments of detail, shall be settled by a Special Commission on which there shall be Jewish representation.

Later in the statement, they note the following with regard to their designated borders and the included water resources:[22]

The boundaries above outlined are what we consider essential for the necessary economic foundation of the country. Palestine must have its natural outlets to the seas and the control of its rivers and their headwaters. The boundaries are sketched with the general economic needs and historic traditions of the country in mind, factors which necessarily must also be considered by the Special Commission in fixing the definite boundary lines. This Commission will bear in mind that it is highly desirable, in the interests of economical administration, that the geographical area of Palestine should be as large as possible, so that it may eventually contain a large and thriving population which could more easily bear the burdens of modern civilized government than a small country with a necessary limitation of inhabitants. The economic life of Palestine, like that of every other semi-arid country, depends on the available water supply. It is, therefore, of vital importance not only to secure all water resources already feeding the country, but also to be able to conserve and control them at their sources. The Hermon is Palestine's real "Father of Waters," and cannot be severed from it without striking at the very root of its economic life. The Hermon not only need re-afforestation but also other work before it can again adequately serve as the water reservoir of the country. It must, therefore, be wholly under the control of those who will most willingly as well as most adequately restore it to its maximum utility. Some international arrangement must be made whereby the riparian rights of the people dwelling south of the Litani River may be fully protected. Properly cared for, these headwaters can be made to serve in the development of the Lebanon as well as of Palestine.

They note the following concerning their eastern designated boundary.[22]

The fertile plains east of the Jordan, since the earliest Biblical times, have been linked economically and politically with the land west of the Jordan. The country which is now very sparsely populated, in Roman times supported a great population. It could now serve admirably for colonization on a large scale. A just regard for the economic needs of Palestine and Arabia demands that free access to the Hedjaz Railway throughout its length be accorded both Governments. An intensive development of the agriculture and other opportunities of Trans-Jordania make it imperative that Palestine shall have access to the Red Sea and an opportunity of developing good harbours on the Gulf of Akaba. Akaba, it will be recalled, was the terminous of an important trade route of Palestine from the days of Solomon onwards. The ports developed in the Gulf of Akaba should be free ports through which the commerce of the Hinterland may pass on the same principle which guides us in suggesting that free access be given to the Hedjaz Railway.

Special Conditions

The following special conditions are attached by the Zionists.

  • Palestine should be placed under political, administrative and economic conditions such that they will secure the establishment of the Jewish National Home and ultimately make possible the creation of an autonomous Commonwealth, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.
  • To do this the Mandatory Power should, among other things previously discussed: Promote Jewish immigration and close settlement on the land, with the established rights of the present non-Jewish population being equitably safeguarded. Accept the cooperation in such measures of a Council representative of the Jews of Palestine and of the world that may be established for the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine and entrust the organization of Jewish education to such Council. After being satisfied that the constitution of such Council precludes the making of private profit, offer to the Council in priority any concession for public works or for the development of natural resources, which it may be found desirable to grant. The Mandatory Power shall encourage the widest measure of self-government for localities practicable in the conditions of the country
  • There shall be forever the fullest freedom of religious worship for all creeds in Palestine There shall be no discrimination among the inhabitants with regard to citizenship and civil rights, on the grounds of religion, or of race
  • (Provision to be inserted relating to the control of the Holy Places)

See also

Notes

  1. ^ Kaufman, Will; Macpherson, Heidi Slettedahl (2007). Britain and the Americas: Culture, Politics, and History. ABC-CLIO. pp. 696. ISBN 1851094318. 
  2. ^ Zionist Organization Statement on Palestine, Paris Peace Conference, (February 3, 1919)
  3. ^ a b c US Dept of State; International Boundary Study, Jordan – Syria Boundary, No. 94 – December 30, 1969, p.10
  4. ^ First World War - Willmott, H. P., Dorling Kindersley, 2003, pp. 292-307.
  5. ^ Jan Morris Farewell the Trumpets (Penguin, London 1978) p.209.
  6. ^ Trachtenberg, Marc “Reparation at the Paris Peace Conference” pages 24-55 from The Journal of Modern History, Volume 51, Issue # 1, March 1979 page 42.
  7. ^ Trachtenberg, Marc “Reparation at the Paris Peace Conference” pages 24-55 from The Journal of Modern History, Volume 51, Issue # 1, March 1979 page 42.
  8. ^ Trachtenberg, Marc “Reparation at the Paris Peace Conference” pages 24-55 from The Journal of Modern History, Volume 51, Issue # 1, March 1979 page 43.
  9. ^ Trachtenberg, Marc “Reparation at the Paris Peace Conference” pages 24-55 from The Journal of Modern History, Volume 51, Issue # 1, March 1979 page 43.
  10. ^ Shimazu (1998), p. 115.
  11. ^ Shimazu (1998), p. 30-31.
  12. ^ Shimazu (1998), pp. 14-15, 117.
  13. ^ MacMillan (2001), p. 3.
  14. ^ MacMillan (2001), p. 6.
  15. ^ King and Cranes Long-Hid Report on the Near East
  16. ^ Rubenberg, Cheryl (1986). Israel and the American National Interest: A Critical Examination. University of Illinois Press. pp. 27. ISBN 0-252-06074-1. 
  17. ^ MacMillan (2001), p. 83.
  18. ^ Wikisource
  19. ^ [www.firstworldwar.com/source/uspeacetreaty_austria.htm]
  20. ^ [www.firstworldwar.com/source/uspeacetreaty_hungary.htm]
  21. ^ a b Statement of the Zionist Organization regarding Palestine
  22. ^ a b Zionist Organization Statement on Palestine, Paris Peace Conference, (February 3, 1919), Boundaries

References

External links