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"Paris 1919" redirects here. For other uses, see Paris 1919 (disambiguation).
Map of the World with the Participants in World War I. The Allies are depicted in green, the Central Powers in orange, and neutral countries in grey.
"The Big Four" during the Paris Peace Conference (from left to right, Lloyd George, Vittorio Emanuele Orlando, Georges Clemenceau, Woodrow Wilson)
The Paris Peace Conference took place in 1919 and involved diplomats from more than 30 countries. They met in an attempt to form a lasting peace throughout the world. The conference took place in Paris and Versailles, soon after the end of World War I.
OverviewThe conference opened on January 18, 1919.[1] It came to a close on January 21, 1920 with the inaugural General Assembly of the League of Nations. The following treaties were prepared at the Paris Peace Conference (in absence of the affected countries):
The disposition of the lands of the former Ottoman Empire were also considered. These discussions included competing European and American aims generally, and competing nationalist Zionist and Arab claims in Palestine. The latter were conditionally agreed to previously by the Faisal-Weizmann Agreement on 3 January 1919. On January 30, the Conference decided that the Arab provinces should be wholly separated from the Ottoman Empire and the newly conceived mandate-system applied to them. This decision clashed with the expectation of Faisal's Arab delegation that his state would include Palestine, and the conditional understandings reached in the Faisal-Weizmann Agreement. On February 3, Chaim Weizmann, the leader of the Zionist delegation, presented its case in a Statement, together with a map of the proposed country. The statement supported the creation of a mandate entrusted to Britain, it detailed this affinity and stated the Jewish historical connection with the area. It also declared the Zionist’s proposed borders and resources “essential for the necessary economic foundation of the country” including “the control of its rivers and their headwaters”. It included statements by others.[2] On 6 February, Faysal addressing the Conference noted previous Allied promises, demanded independence of the whole of Arab Asia, and suggested the establishment of a confederation. He stated that the Arabs needed help but not at the price of their independence. Subsequently a dispute between Great Britain and France concerning the geographical area of Syria and the previously secret Sykes-Picot Agreement delayed decision on various claims.[3] The Paris peace treaties, together with the accords of the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-1922, laid the foundations for the so-called Versailles-Washington system of international relations. The remaking of the world map at these conferences gave birth to a number of critical conflict-prone international contradictions, which would become one of the causes of World War II.[4] The decision to create the League of Nations and the approval of its Charter both took place during the conference. The 'Big Four' — Georges Clemenceau, Prime Minister of France; David Lloyd George, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom; Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States; and Vittorio Orlando, Prime Minister of Italy — were the dominant diplomatic figures at the conference. The conclusions of their talks were imposed on the defeated countries. Australian approachThe Australian delegates were Billy Hughes (Prime Minister), and Joseph Cook (Minister of the Navy), accompanied by Robert Garran (Solicitor-General). John Greig Latham later Sir, was also part of the delegation. Frederic Eggleston had been invited, but left in disgust at Hughes' behaviour. Indeed, Latham was to run successfully for the Federal seat of Kooyong on a policy of 'Get Rid of Hughes', so appalled was he at Hughes' behaviour. Their principal aims were war reparations, annexation of German New Guinea and rejection of the Japanese racial equality proposal (see below). Hughes had a profound interest in what he saw as an extension of the White Australia Policy. Despite causing a big scene, Hughes had to acquiesce to a class C mandate for New Guinea. President Wilson asked Hughes if Australia really wanted to flout world opinion by profiting from Germany's defeat and extending its sovereignty as far north as the equator; Hughes famously replied: "That's about the size of it, Mr. President".[5] French approachThe chief goal of the French leader, Georges Clemenceau, was to weaken Germany militarily, strategically, and economically. Having personally witnessed two German attacks on French soil in the last forty years, the French Premier was adamant that Germany should not be permitted to attack France again. In particular, Clemenceau sought an American and British guarantee of French security in the event of another German attack. Clemenceau also expressed skepticism and frustration with Wilson's Fourteen Points: "Mr. Wilson bores me with his fourteen points," complained Clemenceau. "Why, God Almighty has only ten!" (referring to the Ten Commandments) Another alternative French policy was to seek a rapprochement with Germany. In May 1919, the diplomat René Massigli was sent on several secret missions to Berlin. During his visits, Massigli offered his behalf of his government to revise the territorial and economic clauses of the upcoming peace treaty.[6] Massigli of the desirability of “practical, verbal discussions” between French and German officials that would lead to a “collaboration franco-allemand”.[7] Furthermore, Massagli told the Germans that the French thought of the “Anglo-Saxon powers”, namely the United States and British Empire to be the major threat to France in the post-war world, argued that both France and Germany had a joint interest in opposing “Anglo-Saxon domination” of the world and warned that the “deepening of opposition” between the French and the Germans “would lead to the ruin of both countries, to the advantage of the Anglo-Saxon powers”.[8] The French offers to the Germans was rejected by the latter because the Germans considered the French overtures to be a trap to trick them into accepting the Versailles treaty “as is” and because the German foreign minister, Count Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau thought that the United States was more likely to soften the peace terms than France.[9] There was also some strange affairs with president Wilson playing with all of the delegates so they can gain trust with him.[citation needed] Italy's approachItaly had been persuaded first to join the Triple Alliance and then to join the Allies in order to gain land. In the Treaty of London, 1915, they had been offered the Trentino and the Tyrol as far as Brenner, Trieste and Istria, all the Dalmatian coast except Fiume, full ownership of Albanian Valona and a protectorate over Albania, Antalya in Turkey and a share of Turkish and German Empires in Africa. Vittorio Orlando was sent as the Italian representative with the aim of gaining these and as much other territory as possible. The loss of 700,000 Italians and a budget deficit of 12,000,000,000 Lire during the war made the Italian government and people feel entitled to these territories. There was an especially strong opinion for control of Fiume, which they believed was rightly Italian due to the Italian population. Nevertheless, by the end of the war the allies had made contradictory agreements with other nations, especially in Central Europe and the Middle-East. In the meetings of the "Big Four," in which Orlando's powers of diplomacy were inhibited by his lack of English, the Great powers were only willing to offer Trentino to the Brenner, the Dalmatian port of Zara, the Island of Lagosta and a couple of small German colonies. All other territories were promised to other nations and the great powers were worried about Italy's imperial ambitions. As a result of this, Orlando left the conference in a rage (Jackson, 1938). Japan's approachThe Japanese delegation was headed by Saionji Kimmochi, with Baron Makino Nobuaki, Viscount Chinda Sutemi (ambassador in London), Matsui Keishiro (ambassador in Paris) and Ijuin Hikokichi (ambassador in Rome) and others making a total of 64. Neither Hara Takashi (Prime Minister) nor Yasuya Uchida (Foreign Minister) felt able to leave Japan so shortly after their election. The delegation focused on two demands: (a) the inclusion of their racial equality proposal and (b) territorial claims for the former German colonies; Shandong (including Jiaozhou Bay)and the Pacific islands north of the Equator i.e., the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, the Mariana Islands, and the Carolines. Makino was de facto chief as Saionji's role was symbolic, limited by ill-health. The Japanese were unhappy with the conference because they got only one half of the rights of Germany, and walked out of the conference. The racial equality proposalAfter the end of seclusion, Japan suffered unequal treaties and dreamed of obtaining equal status with the Powers. In this context, the Japanese delegation to the Paris peace conference proposed the racial equality proposal. The first draft was presented to the League of Nations Commission on 13 February as an amendment to Article 21:
It should be noted that the Japanese delegation did not realize the full ramifications of their proposal, and the challenge its adoption would have put to the established norms of the (Western dominated) international system of the day, involving as it did the colonial subjugation of non-white peoples. In the impression of the Japanese delegation, they were only asking for League of Nations to accept the equality of Japanese nationals; however, a universalist meaning and implication of the proposal became attached to it within the delegation, which drove its contentiousness at the conference.[10] The proposal received a majority vote on 28 April 1919. 11 out of the 17 delegates present voted in favor to its amendment to the charter, and no negative vote was taken. The votes for the amendment tallied thus:
Total: 11 Yes
The chairman, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, overturned it saying that although the proposal had been approved by a clear majority, that in this particular matter, strong opposition had manifested itself, and that on this issue a unanimous vote would be required. This strong opposition came from the British delegation[citation needed]. Though in a diary entry by House it says that President Wilson was at least tacitly in favor of accepting the proposal[citation needed], but in the end he felt that British support for the League of Nations was a more crucial goal. There is not much evidence to show that Wilson agreed strongly enough with the proposal to risk alienating the British delegation over it[citation needed]. It is said that behind the scenes Billy Hughes and Joseph Cook vigorously opposed it as it undermined the White Australia Policy. Later, as conflicts between Japan and the U.S. widened, the Japanese media reported the case widely — leading to a grudge toward the U.S. in Japanese public opinion and becoming one of the main pretexts of Pearl Harbor and World War II.[citation needed] As such, this point could be listed among the many causes of conflict which lead to World War II, which were left unaddressed at the close of World War I. It is both ironic and indicative, of the scale of the changes in the mood of the international system, that this contentious point of racial equality would later be incorporated into the United Nations Charter in 1945 as the fundamental principle of international justice. Territorial claimsThe Japanese claim to Shandong was disputed by the Chinese. In 1914 at the outset of First World War Japan had seized the territory granted to Germany in 1897. They also seized the German islands in the Pacific north of the equator. In 1917, Japan had made secret agreements with Britain, France and Italy as regards their annexation of these territories. With Britain, there was a mutual agreement, Japan also agreeing to support British annexation of the Pacific islands south of the equator. Despite a generally pro-Chinese view on behalf of the American delegation, Article 156 of the Treaty of Versailles transferred German concessions in Shandong, China to Japan rather than returning sovereign authority to China. The leader of the Chinese delegation, Lu Zhengxiang, demanded that a reservation be inserted before he would sign the treaty. The reservation was denied, and the treaty was signed by all the delegations except that of China. Chinese outrage over this provision led to demonstrations known as the May Fourth Movement. The Pacific islands north of the equator became a class C mandate administered by Japan. United Kingdom's approachMaintenance of the British Empire's unity, holdings and interests were an overarching concern for the United Kingdom's delegates to the conference, but it entered the conference with the more specific goals of:
with that order of priority. The Racial Equality Proposal put forth by the Japanese did not directly conflict with any of these core British interests. However, as the conference progressed the full implications of the Racial Equality Proposal, regarding immigration to the British Dominions (specifically Australia), would become a major point of contention within the delegation. Ultimately, Britain did not see the Racial Equality proposal as being one of the fundamental aims of the conference. The delegation was therefore willing to sacrifice this proposal in order to placate the Australian delegation and thus help satisfy its overarching aim of preserving the unity of the British Empire.[12] Britain also managed to rebuff attempts by the envoys of the Irish nationalist movement to put its case to the Conference for self-determination, diplomatic recognition and membership of the proposed League of Nations[citation needed]. United States' approachPrior to Wilson's arrival in Europe, no American President had ever visited Europe while in office.[13] Wilson's Fourteen Points, of a year earlier, had helped win the hearts and minds of many as the war ended; these included Americans and Europeans generally, as well as Germany, its allies and the former subjects of the Ottoman Empire specifically. Wilson's diplomacy and his Fourteen Points had essentially established the conditions for the armistices that had brought an end to World War I. Wilson felt it was his duty and obligation to the people of the world to be a prominent figure at the peace negotiations. High hopes and expectations were placed on him to deliver what he had promised for the post-war era. In doing so, Wilson ultimately began to lead the foreign policy of the United States toward interventionism, a move strongly resisted in some domestic circles. Once Wilson arrived, however, he found “rivalries, and conflicting claims previously submerged.”[3] He worked mostly trying to sway the direction that the French (Georges Clemenceau) and British (Lloyd George) delegations were taking towards Germany and its allies in Europe, as well as the former Ottoman lands in the Middle East. Wilson's attempts to gain acceptance of his Fourteen Points ultimately failed, after France and Britain refused to adopt some specific points and its core principles. In Europe, several of his Fourteen Points conflicted with the other powers. The United States did not encourage nor believe that the Article 231 placed on Germany was fair or warranted.[14] It would not be until 1921, when the United States finally signed separate peace treaties with Germany, Austria and Hungary. In the Middle East, negotiations were complicated by competing aims, claims, and the new mandate system. The United States hoped to establish a more liberal and diplomatic world, as stated in the Fourteen Points, where democracy, sovereignty, liberty and self-determination would be respected. France and Britain, on the other hand, already controlled empires, wielded power over their subjects around the world, and still aspired to be dominant colonial powers. In light of the previously secret Sykes-Picot Agreement, and following the adoption of the mandate system on the Arab province of the former Ottoman lands, the conference heard statements from competing Zionist and Arab claimants. President Woodrow Wilson then recommended an international commission of inquiry to ascertain the wishes of the local inhabitants. The Commission idea, first accepted by Great Britain and France, was later rejected. Eventually it became the purely American King-Crane Commission, which toured all Syria and Palestine during the summer of 1919, taking statements and sampling opinion.[3] Its report, presented to President Wilson, was kept secret from the public until the New York Times broke the story in December 1922.[15] A pro-Zionist joint resolution on Palestine was passed by Congress in September 1922.[16] France and Britain tried to appease the American President by consenting to the establishment of his League of Nations. However, because isolationist sentiment was strong and some of the articles in the League's charter conflicted with the United States Constitution, the United States never did ratify the Treaty of Versailles nor join the League of Nations,[17] which President Wilson had helped create, to further peace through diplomacy rather than war and conditions which can breed it.
The United States had proved itself to be a major world player and a dominant military and economic power, but it had still failed to win the peace at Paris. The separate treaties with Germany,[18] Austria,[19] and Hungary[20] in 1921 reserved for the United States all reservations it might have had if it had joined the League of Nations, but accepted none of the obligations, because of the constitution. By this time, Warren G, Harding was President of the United States, and these separate treaties broke the deadlock on the League of Nations. These separate treaties kept the United States out of the League. Statement of the Zionist Organization regarding PalestineThe Zionist Organization submitted their draft resolutions for consideration by the Peace Conference on February 3, 1919. This shortly followed the Conference's decision that the former Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire should be separated from it and the newly conceived mandate-system applied to them. The statement included five main points:[21]
StatementThe statement reiterates the historic title Zionist Jews claim regarding Palestine. They note five main considerations.
The Statement notes Jewish activities and costs, inspired by Zionist ideas over the previous thirty years, that have been directed to Palestine under the Turkish administrative system and their relative success. It notes that Jews have adopted modern scientific methods and have shown themselves to be capable. The Hebrew language has been revived and is used in schools and is the language in daily usage among the Yishuv. It notes that the foundations of a Jewish University have been started in Jerusalem and funds have been contributed for its building and for its endowment. They note the amount of money spent since British occupation for relief, education and sanitation, and the great amounts needed to promote future development, including drainage and irrigation, transportation and all kinds of public works, as well as land settlement and house building. “Assuming a political settlement under which the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine is assured, the Jews of the world will make every effort to provide the vast sums of money that will be needed.” The statement ends noting that the historic title of the Jews to Palestine was recognized by the British Balfour Declaration, 1917 and quotes it in full. The Boundaries of PalestineBoundary Schedule[21]
Later in the statement, they note the following with regard to their designated borders and the included water resources:[22]
They note the following concerning their eastern designated boundary.[22]
Special ConditionsThe following special conditions are attached by the Zionists.
See also
Notes
References
External links
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